Of the past decade's political mysteries, none is deeper or of greater consequence than the set of decisions that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. On Friday, former British prime minister Tony Blair testified at the Iraq Inquiry, a commission set up by the British government to find out how that country went to war, and how the war was run. Given what we know, and what we still need to find out, it is more essential than ever that the U.S. conduct its own full examination of its involvement in Iraq.
The Iraq Inquiry, in its words, aims to "provide a reliable account of events that will help identify lessons to guide future foreign policy decision-making and decisions regarding conflict and post-conflict situations." The members include historians, former civil servants and an independent member of the House of Lords. Its remit extends to all relevant British government papers, ranging from the pre-Sept.-11 era to 2009.
The inquiry gave a platform to Mr. Blair, who explained how Sept. 11, 2001 changed his "calculus of risk" and led him to advocate war: "It was an appalling regime and we couldn't run the risk of such a regime being allowed to develop [weapons of mass destruction]." He explained how Iraq was key to the greater security of the region, given concerns with Iran and the Israeli-Arab conflict.
Mr. Blair's conviction, seriousness of purpose and, compared with George W. Bush, curiosity about the facts, are not in doubt. But the flimsiness of the case presented for the war - to rid Saddam Hussein of WMDs - is not in doubt any more, either. The inquiry showcased a terrible decision-making process in the war's run-up, exposing fissures between Britain and the U.S.
Mr. Blair was not aware of an assessment by a U.S. general that 500,000 troops would be required to effectively occupy Iraq. The coalition had not planned for the obvious, such as a destabilizing role for Iran in a post-Saddam Iraq. Mr. Blair opposed, at least in retrospect, the de-Baathification of Iraq's major institutions.
On these points, and on the torqued intelligence regarding WMDs, the U.S. has yet to have its own process of fact-finding. Failures of intelligence-gathering and decision-making that led to the Sept. 11 attacks prompted a U.S. commission of inquiry. But the Iraq conflict, one that took far more lives due to active decisions by the U.S. government, has been lacking in sunlight; the best source for those seeking the truth are Bob Woodward's books. It is time for a proper, complete accounting in Washington.