The Battle of Quebec may be the most important event in Canadian history. But the official position is to pretend it never happened.
A re-enactment on the Plains of Abraham was hustled off stage earlier this year when noisy Quebec nationalists complained. There's a Canada Post stamp for the 100th anniversary of the little-known Boundary Waters Treaty with the U.S., but not one to note the 250th anniversary of the Battle of Quebec. If not for the provocative reading of the FLQ manifesto at the battlefield this weekend, the significance of Sept. 13, 1759, might not be marked at all.
Among those who still bother with the events of 250 years ago, the modern perspective has become blurred by revisionism and myth-making. The battle itself is generally considered to have been an entirely haphazard affair between two incompetent generals. But for a few lucky breaks on the part of British, victory could just as easily have gone to the French. And then, who knows, Canada might today be a French-speaking paradise.
But such a retelling of Canada's founding moment is disingenuous and bad history besides. In a two-part series, the National Post clears away the myths obscuring the real story of the Battle of Quebec. Today, why the French were never going to win the Seven Years War in North America. Tomorrow, the true military genius of Major-General James Wolfe, "the dauntless hero" of Quebec.
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In 1755, at the opening of the Seven Years War, British colonies along the eastern coast of America were 1.5 million people strong and growing. New France, scattered along the shores of the St. Lawrence and its tributaries, had just 70,000 people, and little growth. At times, British North America boasted nearly as many men in arms as New France had men, women and children.
Yet French forces -- regular troops plus colonial militia and natives --played plucky underdogs for several years.
Massive blunders by British military leadership led to shocking defeats at Monongahela, Fort Oswego and Fort William Henry. French General Marquis de Montcalm made a name for himself by combining traditional European tactics with the woodcraft of his native allies. At Fort Carillon in 1758, he defeated a British force four-times his size.
Despite these early setbacks, however, Britain enjoyed one enormous advantage: Parliament. Representative government under King George II required British political leadership to be practical and flexible, in sharp contrast to the autocratic court of French King Louis XV.
Those early losses in North America led to a political crisis in London and a coalition government with secretary of state William Pitt the Elder given sole control over the war. Pitt's mastery of global strategy laid the foundation for the famed British Empire of the Victorian era.
The Seven Years War was the first truly world war as it was fought across North America, India, the Caribbean, Africa and Europe. Despite this geographic scope, however, Louis XV considered only the European theatre to be of consequence. The rest were mere colonies.
Pitt, on the other hand, figured the struggle in Europe was likely to end in a draw, as it had countless times before. So he avoided sending British troops to the Continent and instead backed Britian's ally, the plucky Prussian Frederick the Great, in hopes he could keep France at bay.
To Pitt, the real opportunities for success lay abroad -- rich colonies in the West Indies, India and North America. This played up Britannia's strength in sea power and world trade.
So Pitt flooded North America with men and money. Where previous British governments ignored the complaints of American colonies, Pitt won them over with cash and stroked their egos by recognizing the rank of colonial officers. Then he set about crafting a plan to take North America whatever the cost.
Step one in 1758 was to capture Louisbourg, the French fort defending the entrance to the St. Lawrence. This was accomplished by General Jeffery Amherst, with help from Major James Wolfe, an up-and-coming officer with a keen interest in amphibious landings. With Louisbourg taken, British troops could move about North America with impunity.
Then in early 1759 Pitt unleashed a three-pronged attack on New France involving nearly 40,000 fighting men. Amherst was to move north on Lake Champlain towards Montreal and Quebec City. Wolfe was to capture the imposing fortress at Quebec City. Another army was to move eastward on Lake Ontario. To Wolfe's campaign alone, Pitt committed one quarter of the entire Royal Navy --over 50 warships and 150 transports.
In defence Montcalm had 5,000 regular and colonial troops, 13,000 Canadian militia (although many were young boys and old men) and a handful of ships. To make matters worse, he was locked in a power struggle with the governor of New France and beset by corruption among government contractors.
Montcalm pleaded for more troops from France and ships to defend the St. Lawrence. As per Pitt's strategy, the French monarchy focused instead on the home-front. "The continuation of the war in Europe, the excessive risks of the sea and the need to unite His Majesty's naval forces do not permit us to ... send you supplies" was the message back from the Crown. New France was on its own.
Successive crop failures had also weakened the French colony and only a bumper harvest in Montreal in 1759 prevented widespread famine and an early end to the war. "The state of the colony is so bad, I must do what I can to ... retard its fall," Montcalm wrote. If he seemed pessimistic, he had good reason to be.
Montcalm was forced to allocate most of his military resources to defend the capital and so the other two British armies moved easily, if slowly, through the forests and waterways in the summer of 1759. New France was soon cut-off from its inland settlements at Detroit and elsewhere. All that was left was for Wolfe to take Quebec.
Of course Wolfe did take Quebec. But it was too late in the year for a march on Montreal and the various prongs of the British army stood down for the winter. The remnants of the French army also regrouped. And the next year they tried to take Quebec back.
After Wolfe's surprising victory, British and French troops met again on the same battlefield in the Battle of Ste. Foy on April 28, 1760. This clash has since been elevated to mythic status by Quebec nationalists, who considered it to be something of a rematch. And since the French won, that must mean the score is tied. Hardly.
The British were indeed routed, and retreated back into Quebec City. And French forces under Chevalier de Levis tried to mount a siege to retake the city. But in the end the Battle of Ste. Foy was of little consequence, for familiar reasons.
As the ice broke up on the St. Lawrence in the spring of 1760, both besieger and besieged waited eagerly for the first supply ships of the year from Europe. This time Louis XV had sent support, a meagre six-ship convoy. But Britain's navy exercised complete control over the seas and it was intercepted. Only British ships would arrive at Quebec City. "I very much fear that France has abandoned us," Levis despaired.
Realizing the game was finally up, the French general and his 2,000 men retreated back to Montreal where he awaited the three prongs of Pitt's army. When Amherst arrived in September with 10,000 men, the last of French colony surrendered without a fight.
Win or lose at Quebec City, the French army was not going to win the war in North America. Abandoned by its king, racked by food shortages, internal corruption and political disagreements and hopelessly outmanned, out-gunned and out-strategized, New France never had a chance.
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Peter Shawn Taylor is editor-at-large of Maclean's magazine.