Cela fait déjà un certain temps que Seymour Hersh n’écrit plus pour le New Yorker. Trop inconfortable, comme William Pfaff quelques années auparavant, également liquidé du grand périodique new-yorkais qui, comme tant d’autres, sacrifie ce qui lui reste de tradition à l’autocensure du conformisme-Système. Hersh s’est donc replié sur le London Review of Books. Il nous revient de temps en temps avec un de ces articles kilométriques, bourré de révélations, appuyés sur tant de sources, dont il a le secret. Cette fois, c’est « Military to Military », en date un peu avancée du 1^er janvier 2016. L’année de la grande Rupture, – espérons-le, – commence tôt cette année...

Hersh nous conte les contacts indirects qui se sont établis entre militaires US et militaires syriens depuis l’été 2013, via les copains (militaires) allemands, israéliens et russes ; bien étrange coalition reflétant le désordre extra-atmosphérique où nous vivons, et impliquant les différents services de renseignement militaires des pays concerné, ainsi que, du côté US, les plus hautes autorités militaires dans le chef du blanc-seing donné à l'opération par l’ex-président (jusqu’en octobre 2015) du Comité des Chefs d’État-Major, le général Dempsey.

Ce que décrit Hersh est assez simple mais tout de même peu ordinaire : absolument stupéfaits, puis frustrés, puis excédés et même angoissés par le refus absolument obstiné de la Maison-Blanche de tenir compte des renseignements des militaires sur l’évolution de la situation en Syrie, une poignée de militaires US dans lesquels on mettra Dempsey et bien entendu le général Michael Flynn, directeur de la DIA, décidèrent de transmettre certains documents et informations vers leurs vis-à-vis allemands, israéliens et russes, sachant que ces vis-à-vis avaient des contacts avec les Syriens au même niveau. Le commentaire de la chose, du côté des généraux US, était que ces correspondants allemands, israéliens et russes pouvaient à leur discrétion passer ce qu’ils voulaient du matériel transmis par les généraux US aux services de renseignement syriens et à l'armée syrienne. Il s'agissait en effet d'aider les Syriens à lutter contre les islamistes extrémistes.

On observera comme un des points centraux à identifier du point de vue de l’information géopolitique de la région dans cet article qu’une place considérable est faite à la Turquie comme un des pays les plus actifs, sinon le plus actif dans le soutien aux islamistes extrémistes, c'est-à-dire au terrorisme selon notre compréhension de la chose, – c'est-à-dire, la Turquie sans doute plus active que l’Arabie ou le Qatar eux-mêmes. Ce constat précède très largement, bien entendu, la destruction du Su-24 le 24 novembre par les Turcs. Cela signifie que les Russes, qui sont bien entendu informés de ce fait et de bien d'autres, et n’ont pu être que confirmés par les informations que leur ont passées les militaires US, sont intervenus au Moyen-Orient avec peut-être comme but stratégique principal d’installer une pression militaire permanente sur la frontière occidentale de la Turquie. On en déduira qu'il nous semblerait bien que la querelle publique entre la Russie et la Turquie à cause du Su-24 n’est pas prête de s’apaiser ; il apparaît très probable que les Russes devraient l’utiliser pour justifier désormais de façon voyante sinon menaçante cette pression sur la frontière turque

Nous ne reprenons qu’une partie de l’article, – en fait la partie du début et celle de la fin, où il est directement question de ces opérations de transfert d'information et du climat politique qui les a justifiées et qui règne aujourd’hui. L’on y apprend, sans trop de surprise, que le départ de Flynn en 2014 était quelque peu anticipé et constituait une forme de “purge” contre cet officier général un peu trop insistant pour faire tenter de faire franchir à ses informations sur la folie de la non-politique syrienne US cette “narrative impénétrable” érigée comme une bulle à l’épreuve de toutes les vérités-de-situation autour de Sa-Grandeur BHO. Et l’on peut alors avoir une confirmation pleine et entière que le général Michael Flynn doit être considéré désormais comme un de ces héroïques “lanceurs d’alerte” sortis du Système et décidé à mener la bataille antiSystème. Hersh cite Pat Lang (ancien de la DIA, éditeur du site Sic Semper Tyrannis [SST]) et Flynn lui-même, – personnage au langage significatif et imagé comme cela nous convient puisqu’en arrivant à la DIA, il était décidé à tenter de réformer profondément cette agence, et non pas “simplement de déplacer les fauteuils sur le pont du Titanic...” Belle image et salut au général Flynn.

« “Flynn déclencha la colère de la Maison-Blanche en insistant pour leur communiquer la vérité à propos de la Syrie”, dit Patrick Lang, un colonel de l’US Army à la retraite qui fut pendant près d’une décennie chef de la division du renseignement sur le Moyen-Orient à la DIA. “Il pensait que la vérité était le meilleur argument possible et ils se sont débarrassés de lui. Mais il ne se taira pas.” Flynn me dit [à Hersh] que ses problèmes allaient bien au-delà de la Syrie. “Je voulais tout changer à la DIA, – et pas seulement déplacer les fauteuils sur le pont du Titanic. C’étaient des réformes radicales. Je sentais bien que la direction civile ne voulait pas qu’on lui dise la vérité. J’ai souffert à cause de ça mais tout va bien pour moi...” »

Bref, l’article de Hersh qui est tout sauf bref est une véritable mine. Il nous fait comprendre qu’il y a eu une véritable révolte souterraine chez des militaires US des plus hauts rangs (une “révolte des généraux” même s’il s’agit d’un nombre limité), jusqu’à ce que ces hommes formés par le devoir des armes et le serment d’allégeance à la Constitution considèrent à partir de l’automne 2013 comme conforme à cette haute tâche et cet engagement d’honneur de faire indirectement parvenir des informations classifiées à un pouvoir proclamé ennemi de leur pays. Ils ont donc reconnu de facto que le pouvoir civil était aux mains d’une “tendance”, d’une mécanique, d’une chose, – et nous dirions évidemment, d’une entité, dont nous utilisons si souvent le nom, – le Système, évidemment, qui est bien plus qu’un “système” comme on a l’habitude de dire. (Il s’agit bien entendu d’une situation extraordinaire, comme nous ne cessons de l’observer. De même, le terme de “révolte des généraux” utilisée ici pour la facilité de la chose, ne désigne nullement une situation de révolte affichée, de pronunciamiento, etc., comme on a pu en observer dans l’histoire. Tout est différent depuis quasiment deux décennies : les guerres, les politiques, les comportements, les psychologies, par conséquent “les révoltes”, etc.)

En un sens, on doit admettre qu’avec les départs de Flynn et de Dempsey, cette “révolte des généraux” est jugulée, d’autant que les successeurs sont bien incertains ; le général Dunford qui remplace Dempsey n’a pas l’air de bénéficier d’un préjugé très favorable et il y a beaucoup d’incertitude à son égard (voir les commentaires d’un texte qui n’est qu’une courte interrogation à propos de Dunford, de Pat Lang sur son site SST). D’autre part, il faut bien voir que ce n’est pas la première “révolte des généraux” depuis 9/11 (voir deux fois en 2006, en 2007 avec l’amiral Fallon et l’US Navy, etc.). Le point remarquable de cette situation est que la corruption généralisée du Système, psychologique et vénale, qui sévit à ciel ouvert et en mode-turbo au moins depuis 9/11 et même depuis la fin de la Guerre froide, ne parvient pas à empêcher la résurgence régulière de “révoltes” de cette sorte, qui vont d’ailleurs en s’aggravant si l’on considère celle que décrit Hersh, à mesure de l’aggravation des conséquences de la politique-Système. Il est donc très probable qu’il y aura d’autres Flynn... Par ailleurs, ce n’est qu’un élément dans la situation générale, et l’extraordinaire stupidité de la direction civile et de la politique-Système apporte elle-même de l’eau au moulin de l’autodestruction, et l’on sait même que c’en est le principal apport.

Bien entendu et une fois de plus se pose la sempiternelle question, à la fin de l’article de Hersh : pourquoi Obama laisse-t-il faire ce qu’il laisse faire ? Pourquoi s’est-il laissé enfermer dans sa “narrative impénétrable” ? Bref, l’“énigme Obama”, comme on dit business as usual ... Voici donc les deux extraits de l’article de Seymour Hersh dans le London Review of Books daté du 1^er janvier 2016.

dedefensa.org

Military to Military

Barack Obama’s repeated insistence that Bashar al-Assad must leave office – and that there are ‘moderate’ rebel groups in Syria capable of defeating him – has in recent years provoked quiet dissent, and even overt opposition, among some of the most senior officers on the Pentagon’s Joint Staff. Their criticism has focused on what they see as the administration’s fixation on Assad’s primary ally, Vladimir Putin. In their view, Obama is captive to Cold War thinking about Russia and China, and hasn’t adjusted his stance on Syria to the fact both countries share Washington’s anxiety about the spread of terrorism in and beyond Syria; like Washington, they believe that Islamic State must be stopped.

The military’s resistance dates back to the summer of 2013, when a highly classified assessment, put together by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then led by General Martin Dempsey, forecast that the fall of the Assad regime would lead to chaos and, potentially, to Syria’s takeover by jihadi extremists, much as was then happening in Libya. A former senior adviser to the Joint Chiefs told me that the document was an ‘all-source’ appraisal, drawing on information from signals, satellite and human intelligence, and took a dim view of the Obama administration’s insistence on continuing to finance and arm the so-called moderate rebel groups. By then, the CIA had been conspiring for more than a year with allies in the UK, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to ship guns and goods – to be used for the overthrow of Assad – from Libya, via Turkey, into Syria. The new intelligence estimate singled out Turkey as a major impediment to Obama’s Syria policy. The document showed, the adviser said, ‘that what was started as a covert US programme to arm and support the moderate rebels fighting Assad had been co-opted by Turkey, and had morphed into an across-the-board technical, arms and logistical programme for all of the opposition, including Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State. The so-called moderates had evaporated and the Free Syrian Army was a rump group stationed at an airbase in Turkey.’ The assessment was bleak: there was no viable ‘moderate’ opposition to Assad, and the US was arming extremists.

Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, director of the DIA between 2012 and 2014, confirmed that his agency had sent a constant stream of classified warnings to the civilian leadership about the dire consequences of toppling Assad. The jihadists, he said, were in control of the opposition. Turkey wasn’t doing enough to stop the smuggling of foreign fighters and weapons across the border. ‘If the American public saw the intelligence we were producing daily, at the most sensitive level, they would go ballistic,’ Flynn told me. ‘We understood Isis’s long-term strategy and its campaign plans, and we also discussed the fact that Turkey was looking the other way when it came to the growth of the Islamic State inside Syria.’ The DIA’s reporting, he said, ‘got enormous pushback’ from the Obama administration. ‘I felt that they did not want to hear the truth.’

‘Our policy of arming the opposition to Assad was unsuccessful and actually having a negative impact,’ the former JCS adviser said. ‘The Joint Chiefs believed that Assad should not be replaced by fundamentalists. The administration’s policy was contradictory. They wanted Assad to go but the opposition was dominated by extremists. So who was going to replace him? To say Assad’s got to go is fine, but if you follow that through – therefore anyone is better. It’s the “anybody else is better” issue that the JCS had with Obama’s policy.’ The Joint Chiefs felt that a direct challenge to Obama’s policy would have ‘had a zero chance of success’. So in the autumn of 2013 they decided to take steps against the extremists without going through political channels, by providing US intelligence to the militaries of other nations, on the understanding that it would be passed on to the Syrian army and used against the common enemy, Jabhat al-Nusra and Islamic State.

Germany, Israel and Russia were in contact with the Syrian army, and able to exercise some influence over Assad’s decisions – it was through them that US intelligence would be shared. Each had its reasons for co-operating with Assad: Germany feared what might happen among its own population of six million Muslims if Islamic State expanded; Israel was concerned with border security; Russia had an alliance of very long standing with Syria, and was worried by the threat to its only naval base on the Mediterranean, at Tartus. ‘We weren’t intent on deviating from Obama’s stated policies,’ the adviser said. ‘But sharing our assessments via the military-to-military relationships with other countries could prove productive. It was clear that Assad needed better tactical intelligence and operational advice. The JCS concluded that if those needs were met, the overall fight against Islamist terrorism would be enhanced. Obama didn’t know, but Obama doesn’t know what the JCS does in every circumstance and that’s true of all presidents.’

Once the flow of US intelligence began, Germany, Israel and Russia started passing on information about the whereabouts and intent of radical jihadist groups to the Syrian army; in return, Syria provided information about its own capabilities and intentions. There was no direct contact between the US and the Syrian military; instead, the adviser said, ‘we provided the information – including long-range analyses on Syria’s future put together by contractors or one of our war colleges – and these countries could do with it what they chose, including sharing it with Assad. We were saying to the Germans and the others: “Here’s some information that’s pretty interesting and our interest is mutual.” End of conversation. The JCS could conclude that something beneficial would arise from it – but it was a military to military thing, and not some sort of a sinister Joint Chiefs’ plot to go around Obama and support Assad. It was a lot cleverer than that. If Assad remains in power, it will not be because we did it. It’s because he was smart enough to use the intelligence and sound tactical advice we provided to others.’

[...]

General Dempsey and his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff kept their dissent out of bureaucratic channels, and survived in office. General Michael Flynn did not. ‘Flynn incurred the wrath of the White House by insisting on telling the truth about Syria,’ said Patrick Lang, a retired army colonel who served for nearly a decade as the chief Middle East civilian intelligence officer for the DIA. ‘He thought truth was the best thing and they shoved him out. He wouldn’t shut up.’ Flynn told me his problems went beyond Syria. ‘I was shaking things up at the DIA – and not just moving deckchairs on the Titanic. It was radical reform. I felt that the civilian leadership did not want to hear the truth. I suffered for it, but I’m OK with that.’ In a recent interview in Der Spiegel, Flynn was blunt about Russia’s entry into the Syrian war: ‘We have to work constructively with Russia. Whether we like it or not, Russia made a decision to be there and to act militarily. They are there, and this has dramatically changed the dynamic. So you can’t say Russia is bad; they have to go home. It’s not going to happen. Get real.’

Few in the US Congress share this view. One exception is Tulsi Gabbard, a Democrat from Hawaii and member of the House Armed Services Committee who, as a major in the Army National Guard, served two tours in the Middle East. In an interview on CNN in October she said: ‘The US and the CIA should stop this illegal and counterproductive war to overthrow the Syrian government of Assad and should stay focused on fighting against … the Islamic extremist groups.’

‘Does it not concern you,’ the interviewer asked, ‘that Assad’s regime has been brutal, killing at least 200,000 and maybe 300,000 of his own people?’

‘The things that are being said about Assad right now,’ Gabbard responded, ‘are the same that were said about Gaddafi, they are the same things that were said about Saddam Hussein by those who were advocating for the US to … overthrow those regimes … If it happens here in Syria … we will end up in a situation with far greater suffering, with far greater persecution of religious minorities and Christians in Syria, and our enemy will be far stronger.’

‘So what you are saying,’ the interviewer asked, ‘is that the Russian military involvement in the air and on-the-ground Iranian involvement – they are actually doing the US a favour?’

‘They are working toward defeating our common enemy,’ Gabbard replied.

Gabbard later told me that many of her colleagues in Congress, Democrats and Republicans, have thanked her privately for speaking out. ‘There are a lot of people in the general public, and even in the Congress, who need to have things clearly explained to them,’ Gabbard said. ‘But it’s hard when there’s so much deception about what is going on. The truth is not out.’ It’s unusual for a politician to challenge her party’s foreign policy directly and on the record. For someone on the inside, with access to the most secret intelligence, speaking openly and critically can be a career-ender. Informed dissent can be transmitted by means of a trust relationship between a reporter and those on the inside, but it almost invariably includes no signature. The dissent exists, however. The longtime consultant to the Joint Special Operations Command could not hide his contempt when I asked him for his view of the US’s Syria policy. ‘The solution in Syria is right before our nose,’ he said. ‘Our primary threat is Isis and all of us – the United States, Russia and China – need to work together. Bashar will remain in office and, after the country is stabilised there will be an election. There is no other option.’

The military’s indirect pathway to Assad disappeared with Dempsey’s retirement in September. His replacement as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Joseph Dunford, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July, two months before assuming office. ‘If you want to talk about a nation that could pose an existential threat to the United States, I’d have to point to Russia,’ Dunford said. ‘If you look at their behaviour, it’s nothing short of alarming.’ In October, as chairman, Dunford dismissed the Russian bombing efforts in Syria, telling the same committee that Russia ‘is not fighting’ IS. He added that America must ‘work with Turkish partners to secure the northern border of Syria’ and ‘do all we can to enable vetted Syrian opposition forces’ – i.e. the ‘moderates’ – to fight the extremists.

Obama now has a more compliant Pentagon. There will be no more indirect challenges from the military leadership to his policy of disdain for Assad and support for Erdogan. Dempsey and his associates remain mystified by Obama’s continued public defence of Erdogan, given the American intelligence community’s strong case against him – and the evidence that Obama, in private, accepts that case. ‘We know what you’re doing with the radicals in Syria,’ the president told Erdogan’s intelligence chief at a tense meeting at the White House (as I reported in the LRB of 17 April 2014). The Joint Chiefs and the DIA were constantly telling Washington’s leadership of the jihadist threat in Syria, and of Turkey’s support for it. The message was never listened to. Why not?

Seymour M. Hersh